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I.

INTRODUCTION

The meaning of section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")'
has been the subject of substantial litigation and uncertainty. 2 Section 3
applies to a suit or proceeding brought in court where the issues are
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing. 3 The statute
states:
[T]he court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the
issue involved in such suit or proceedings is referable to arbitration
under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the partiesstay
the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in
accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant

for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
As an initial matter, in deciding whether to compel arbitration,
courts must first find that a valid arbitration agreement exists and that
the dispute in question is within the scope of such agreement.5 Once this
has been established, according to FAA section 3, the presiding judge
"shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until
such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement." '6 The United States Courts of Appeals have differing views
as to whether judges have the discretion to deny a motion for a stay
pending arbitration and instead dismiss a complaint where it finds all of
the claims before it to be arbitrable.7
1. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2005). Originally titled the United States
Arbitration Act, title 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, was first enacted February 12, 1925 (43 Stat. 883), codified
July 30, 1947 (61 Stat. 669). Chapter 2 was added on July 31, 1970 (84 Stat. 692) and Chapter 3
was added on August 15, 1990 (104 Stat. 448).
2. See generally Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC, 369 F.3d 263 (3rd Cir. 2004); Choice Hotels
Int'l, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2001); Green v. Ameritech Corp.,
200 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2000); Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141 (1st Cir. 1998); Adair
Bus Sales, Inc. v. Blue Bird Corp., 25 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 1994); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988).
3. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2005).
4. Id. (emphasis added).
5.

STEPHEN K. HUBER, ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 61, 215 (1998).

6. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2005).
7. Compare Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707, 709-10
(4th Cir. 2001) ("Notwithstanding the terms of § 3, however, dismissal is a proper remedy when all
of the issues presented in a lawsuit are arbitrable."); Green v. Ameritech Corp., 200 F.3d 967, 973
(6th Cir. 2000) (quoting and relying on Sparling); Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141,
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A stay is a court-ordered, short-term postponement or halting of a
proceeding or judgment. 8 Procedurally, issuing a stay pending arbitration
postpones judicial trial, and allows parties time to arbitrate their dispute.
When a court issues a stay there are no court proceedings on matters
subject to arbitration, until the arbitration is complete. 9 A court's
authority under section 3 of the FAA to stay a proceeding pending
arbitration does not expressly include the authority to compel
arbitration. 10 However, the grant of the stay is enough without the power
to order that the arbitration proceed, since the plaintiff would be unable
to obtain relief without proceeding to arbitration." An
order staying
12
judicial proceedings is not an appealable final decision.
Some courts have held that issuing a stay pending arbitration is3
mandatory under FAA section 3 when requested by one of the parties.'
However, other courts, either at the request of a party or sua sponte,
have held that dismissing litigation rather than issuing a stay pending
arbitration is the more appropriate measure.' 4 The Supreme Court has
yet to rule on this issue. In a recent decision, Lloyd v. HO VENSA, LLC, 15
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals exacerbated the split among the

156 & n.21 (1st Cir. 1998) (remanding a case to the district court to decide whether to dismiss or
stay, depending upon whether all issues before the court are arbitrable); Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161, 1165 (5th Cir. 1992) (supporting dismissal), and Sparling v.
Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988); with Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC., 369 F.3d 263,
269 (3rd Cir. 2004) ("the District Court was obligated... to grant a stay"), andAdair Bus Sales v.
Blue Bird Corp., 25 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 1994) ("The proper course... would have been for the
district court to grant Defendant's motion and stay the action pending arbitration.").
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1453 (8th ed. 2004). "An order to suspend all or part of a
judicial proceeding or a judgment resulting from that proceeding." Id.
9. USM Corp. v. GKN Fasteners, Ltd., 574 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1978).
10. M & I Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Rapistan Demag Corp., 814 F. Supp. 545, 546 (E.D. Tex.
1993).
11. Id.; Anaconda v. Am. Sugar Co., 322 U.S. 43, 45 (1943).
12. See discussion infra Part V.C.; Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79,
87 n.2 (2000) ("Had the District Court entered a stay instead of a dismissal in this case, that order
would not be appealable."); see also Apache Bohai Corp. v. Texaco China, B.V., 330 F.3d 307, 309
(5th Cir. 2003) cert. denied 540 U.S. 880 (2003) (dismissing an appeal for lack of appellate
jurisdiction, holding that the issuance of a stay is not a final decision and thus not immediately
appealable, and reasoning "a stay, by definition, constitutes a postponement of proceedings, not a
termination, and thus lacks finality").
13. See generally Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC., 369 F.3d 263 (3rd Cir. 2004); Adair Bus Sales
v. Blue Bird Corp., 25 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 1994).
14. See generally Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707 (4th
Cir. 2001); Green v. Ameritech Corp., 200 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2000); Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch.,
Inc., 133 F.3d 141 (1st Cir. 1998); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir.
1992); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988).
15. 369 F.3d 263 (3rd Cir. 2004).
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circuits by interpreting FAA section 3 as requiring a presiding 6judge to
issue a stay pending arbitration instead of an order of dismissal.1
This Note addresses the split among the circuits and posits how the
Supreme Court should resolve this discrepancy. Part II begins with an
overview of the FAA and the purpose for its enactment. Part III
discusses the legislative history behind the FAA. Part IV introduces the
conflicting case law concerning the issue of granting a stay versus
granting a dismissal. Part V offers that when either party makes a motion
for a stay pending arbitration, such stay must be granted instead of an
order of dismissal. This is the correct measure to take even when all
issues before the court are arbitrable. The FAA should be read as
requiring the issuance of a stay pending arbitration, as a matter of
statutory construction, legislative history, and sound public policy.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT

A.

Scope of the FAA

The FAA governs arbitration agreements involving maritime
disputes and contracts involving interstate commerce.1 7 Under the FAA,
interstate commerce includes commerce with foreign countries and the
FAA's strong policy of arbitration extends to disputes involving
international transactions.18 Commerce with
other countries
encompasses contracts negotiated in another country that are to be
performed outside of the United States.' 9
As a result of subsequent judicial expansion of the meaning of
interstate commerce, the United States Supreme Court reinterpreted the
FAA to cover the full scope of interstate commerce.2 ° In PrimaryPaint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., the Court held that
16. Id. at 268, 271.
17. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2005).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003) ("We have interpreted the term
'involving commerce' in the FAA as the functional equivalent of the more familiar term 'affecting
commerce' ... [b]ecause the statute provides for 'the enforcement of arbitration agreements within
the full reach of the Commerce Clause, it is perfectly clear that the FAA encompasses a wider range
of transactions than those actually 'in commerce'-that is, 'within the flow of interstate
commerce.'") (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1994)
(emphasis added)); Nelson v. INSIGNIA/ESG, Inc., 215 F. SupP.2d 143, 149 (D.D.C. 2002)
("Since its adoption, the Supreme Court has consistently given an expansive interpretation to the
scope of the FAA."). This Note will focus on those instances where the FAA would be deemed
applicable because the contract involved "affects" interstate commerce.
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Congress intended for the FAA to apply to diversity cases and enacted
the FAA pursuant to the commerce clause.2 1 Also, in Southland Corp. v.
Keating, the Court held that the FAA applies to federal claims, as well as
state law claims in state court and that the FAA pre-empts all contrary
state arbitration statutes.22
B. InitiatingArbitration-HowThis Issue Arises in Court
In general, there are a number of patterns that may arise from a
dispute involving a contract containing an arbitration clause. First, a
plaintiff can initiate arbitration, and the defendant can contest that the
dispute is not covered by the parties' arbitration agreement.2 3 Second,
either party can file suit to compel arbitration.24 Finally, a plaintiff can
ignore the arbitration contract and file suit in a court of law.25 This third
scenario will be the focus of this Note.
In such an instance a defendant can either request a court to grant a
stay of the suit pending arbitration under FAA section 3, or make a
motion to compel arbitration of the dispute under FAA section 4, or
concurrently seek both types of relief.26 According to Judge Posner,
Congress appeared to have assumed that a section 3 stay would be used
to "stop a lawsuit begun by the party resisting arbitration, and then, if the
stay didn't induce him to arbitrate... the party wanting arbitration
would bring a separate action under section 4.'27 This Note presumes
that the party seeking to enforce the arbitration agreement makes a
timely motion to stay litigation pending arbitration.
Three requirements must be satisfied before a court can grant relief
permitted by FAA sections 3 and 4.28 First, there must be a binding
written arbitration agreement. 29 Second, the issue in the dispute must be
within the scope of the arbitration provision. 30 Third, the claim must be

21. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,405 (1967).
22. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984).
23. See MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 22.1 (Larry E. Edmonson
ed. 3d ed. 2005).
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. Id.Remedies under FAA sections 3 and 4 can be pursued separately or in conjunction
with each other. Id.
27. Matterhorn, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 763 F.2d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing S. Rep. No. 536,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924)); Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal
ArbitrationLaw, 12 VA. L. REv. 265, 267 (1926).
28. See DOMKE, supranote 23, at § 22.2 (2005).
29. See id.
30. See id.
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arbitrable. 3 1 The concept of arbitrability can be described as the inquiry
of whether the parties' dispute is to be resolved through a judicial
proceeding rather than an arbitration proceeding.32
Upon such a finding courts must compel arbitration and leave the
merits of the claim and defenses to be decided by the arbitrator.
According to Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, "[b]y its terms, the
[FAA] leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court,
but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to
proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has
been signed. 3 3 In enforcing an arbitration agreement, courts have either
stayed the suit, stayed the suit and compelled arbitration, or dismissed
the suit and compelled arbitration. This Note questions a court's decision
to dismiss a pending suit instead of granting a motion to stay litigation
pending arbitration.
III.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FAA

A.

HistoricalBasisfor the FAA

The need for a federal arbitration act stemmed from "an
anachronism of our American law." 34 Centuries ago, English courts
"refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate., 35 The Senate
Report on the FAA explained that the purpose of the statute was to
overturn the "very old law.., that if an action at law were brought on
the contract containing the agreement to arbitrate, such agreement could
not be pleaded in bar of the action nor would such an agreement be
ground for a stay of proceedings until arbitration was had., 36 This
archaic rule of law was firmly embedded in the English common law
and was adopted by the American courts.3 7
31.

See id.

32.

TIBOR VARADY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A TRANSITIONAL

PERSPECTIVE 208 (2d ed. 2003) ("[C]ountries have traditionally been reluctant to allow arbitration
in spheres where there is a strong public interest at stake. Even after the early hostility towards
arbitration was reversed, countries continued to distinguish between domains in which public
interest and public control are relatively weak, and areas in which society (the state) has strong
vested interests and policies. Disputes belonging to the first domain are arbitrable; lawsuits falling
into the latter area are reserved for courts and other state authorities. The issue of arbitrability is thus
one of the most important threshold questions in the arbitration process.").
33. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (emphasis added).
34. H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1924).
35. Id.
36. S. Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1924).
37. Id.
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Several reasons have been given to explain why, prior to the
enactment of the FAA, state and federal courts continued to follow the
old English common law of refusing to enforce arbitration agreements.3 8
First, there was an "expressed fear on the part of the courts that
arbitration tribunals did not posses the ability to give full or proper
redress" of legal harms.39 Second, courts feared being "ousted from
much of their jurisdiction" through use of a private agreement. 40 Finally,
arbitration agreements were not enforced because of established
precedent.4 1 The old English rule was carried on long after courts
themselves began to question whether it was founded in reason or
justice; courts were hesitant to change established precedent.42 Due to
this "strongly fixed" precedent, prior to 1925 courts felt that such a rule
could not be overturned without legislative enactment.43
B.

The FAA 's Processof Enactment

44
The FAA was modeled after the New York State Arbitration Act
which was the first U.S. statute validating agreements to submit disputes
to arbitration. 45 After its adoption "several states followed the lead of
New York and enacted arbitration statutes to remove the common law

38. H. R. Rep. No. 96 at 1-2.
39. S.Rep. No. 536 at 2.
40. H. R. Rep. No. 96 at 1-2. Prior to the enactment of the FAA, an agreement to arbitrate
would not be enforced in U.S. courts because there was a concern of parties by private agreement
ousting the jurisdiction of the courts. See Am. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Anaconda, 138 F.2d 765, 766-67
(5th Cir. 1943) ("The act was passed not to oust the jurisdiction of the courts but to provide for
maintaining their jurisdiction while at the same time recognizing arbitration agreements as
affirmative defenses and providing a forum for their specific enforcement.").
41. S.Rep. No. 536 at 3 (1924).
42. Id. ("Established precedent has had its large part of course in perpetuating the old rules
long after the courts themselves could no longer see that they were founded in reason or justice.").
43. See H. R. Rep. No. 96 at 2 (1924); see also Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 5 F.2d
218, 220 (2d Cir. 1924) Holding that the federal court sitting in admiralty could not compel
arbitration under an arbitration clause, Judge Hough declared:
[W]ithout legislation, and because the trend of modem opinion is toward the literal
enforcement of the contracts of men of mature years and presumably sound mind, this
court is asked to provide some method of overriding, or explaining away not only its
own previous decisions but those of the Supreme Court, which for a generation or so
have been regarded as declaring the law to be that any agreement contained in an
executory contract, ousting in advance all courts of every whit of jurisdiction to decide
contests arising out of that contract, will not be enforced by the courts so ousted.
Id.
44. 1920 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 275; see also KATHERINE V.W. STONE, ARBITRATION LAW 10
(2003).
45. See STONE, supra note 44, at 6 ("Modem arbitration law has its origin in the New York
Arbitration Act of 1920.").
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doctrine of revocability and provide for legal enforcement of executory
promises to arbitrate. ' ' 6 The American Bar Association Committee on
Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law prepared drafts for a federal
arbitration act in 1921, 1922, and 1923.47 On December 20, 1922,
Senator Sterling and Congressman Mills introduced a bill in the 67th
Congress that provided for a federal arbitration act.48 The bill was
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary in each House of Congress.49
Unfortunately the bill did not reach the Senate for a full vote, due to
lateness of the session and the pressure of other important business, and
died in committee the same year.5 °
After some rewriting, the American Bar Association proposal was
reintroduced in the 68th Congress.5 ' The proposal was reintroduced by
Congressman Mills on December 5, 1923, in the House of
Representatives, and in the Senate by Senator Sterling on December 12,
1923.52 The following month, Congress held hearings on the proposed
bill.53 It was unanimously supported by the Senate and House
Committees on the Judiciary sub-committees.54 On February 12, 1925,
the United States Arbitration Law, later renamed the Federal Arbitration
Act, was signed by President Coolidge.55
C. The Principles Underlying the FAA
According to the House Report, the enactment of a federal
arbitration act was intended "to make valid and enforceable agreements
for arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate commerce or
within the jurisdiction of admiralty, or which may be the subject of
litigation in the Federal courts. '5 6 The FAA was meant to properly place
57
arbitration agreements on the "same footing as other contracts.
Further, the Report stated that arbitration agreements are "purely matters
46. Id.at 10.
47. See id.
48. W. H. H. Piatt et al., The United States ArbitrationLaw and its Application, 11 A.B.A. J.
153, 153 (1925).
49. See id.
50. See id
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. See STONE, supra note 44, at 10.
54. Id. at 11; Piatt et al., supra note 48, at 153; H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1
(1924) ("There was no opposition to the bill before the committee."); S.Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess., 1 (1924) ("[T]he committee recommended that the bill do pass.").
55. See STONE,supra note 44, at 11; Piatt etal., supra note 48, at 153.
56. H. R. Rep. No. 96 at 1.
57. Id.
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of contract," and that the effect of the FAA was "simply to make the
contracting party live up to his agreement." 58
In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,59 the Supreme Court further
clarified the purpose behind the enactment of the FAA. 60 According to
the Court, Congress pursued two independent objectives when enacting
the FAA.6 1 First, the FAA's ratification was primarily motivated by a
congressional desire to "enforce agreements into which parties had
entered. 62 Second, Congress sought to encourage efficient and speedy
dispute resolution. 63 Thus, in order to determine adequately the
requirements under FAA section 3, one must take into account these two
goals which are the backbone of the FAA. Courts must not only provide
a forum for the specific enforcement of arbitration agreements, but must
also reduce technicality, delay, and expense of arbitration.
D. Comparisonto New York ArbitrationAct of 1920
As discussed above, the FAA was modeled after the New York
Arbitration Act of 1920 ("New York Arbitration Act").64 Julius Cohen, a
principal drafter of the FAA, stated that "there can be little doubt that the
attitude and the decisions of the New York courts will be persuasive in
the interpretation of the Federal statute since the provisions of the two
are largely identical., 65 Accordingly, the FAA should be afforded the
same interpretation given to the New York Arbitration Act at the time of
the FAA's enactment.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
470 U.S. 213 (1985).
See id. at 220-21.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
Cohen & Dayton, supra note 27, at 275.
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Similar to other arbitration statutes, 6 the New York Arbitration Act
has an analogous stay requirement to the one found in section 3 of the
FAA.67 Under the language of section 5 of the New York Arbitration
Act, "[i]f any suit or proceeding be brought upon any issue otherwise
referable to arbitration. . . the supreme court... upon being satisfied
that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to
arbitration.. . shall stay the trial of the action until such arbitrationhas
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement."68 Except for
minor differences, 69 the New York Arbitration Act's language was
copied in section 3 of the FAA. 70 Thus, it is reasonable to infer that FAA
section 3 was meant to mirror the New York Arbitration Act's standard
for requiring the issuance of a stay pending arbitration.
In Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 71 the New York Court of
Appeals interpreted the New York Arbitration Act.72 The case dealt with
parties who had contracted for the sale of goods.73 The parties also
agreed that claims in regards to the contract "shall not invalidate [such]
contract," but "shall be settled amicably or by arbitration ....

,7 The

66. Under the Uniform Arbitration Act, section 2(d) "[a]ny action or proceeding involving an
issue subject to arbitration shall be stayed if an order for arbitration ... has been made."
Additionally, "[w]hen the application is made in such action or proceeding, the order for arbitration
shall include such stay." Uniform Arbitration Act, 7 U.L.A. § 2(d) (Supp. 2004). The Uniform
Arbitration Act ("UAA") governs the arbitration of disputes arising from intrastate matters and
matters in which state law controls. DOMKE, supra note 23, § 22.13. Many states have adopted the
UAA while other states have used it as a pattern for their state arbitration statutes. Pursuant to
England's Arbitration Act of 1996 Part I Section 9 "[a] party to an arbitration agreement against
whom legal proceedings are brought... in respect of a matter which under the agreement is to be
referred to arbitration may... apply to the court in which the proceedings have been brought to stay
the proceedings so far as they concern that matter." In addition, "[o]n application under this section
the court shall grant a stay unless satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void,
inoperative, or incapable of being performed." England Arbitration Act of 1996, §§ 9(1), 9(4).
67. Compare New York Arbitration Act of 1920, N.Y. Laws, Ch. 275, § 5, with Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1925).
68. 1920 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 275, § 5 (emphasis added).
69. Differences between the New York Arbitration Act of 1920 section 5 and the Federal
Arbitration Act section 3 include (1) the FAA's reference to its scope including "any of the courts of
the United States"; (2) the FAA's explicit requirement that the agreement to arbitrate be in writing;
(3) the FAA's requirement that an application for a stay be made by one of the parties; and (4) the
FAA's additional requirement that the applicant for the stay not be in default in proceeding with
such arbitration. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1925).
70. Compare New York Arbitration Act of 1920, 1920 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 275, § 5, with Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1925).
71. 130 N.E. 288 (N.Y. 1921).
72. See id. at 289 ("The validity of the Arbitration Law and its application to existing
contracts and pending actions, are the questions here involved.") (citations omitted).
73. See id.
74. Id.
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court held, that the "[c]ontending parties ...contracted that the merits of
their
controversy ...be
conditioned
upon
the
report
of
arbitrators .. . .75 The court then questioned arbitrability of the claims.76
It held that if the contract had not been made or was invalid, "the court
will proceed, as in any other case to a determination of the merits. 77
However, if the contract was in fact made and was valid, "the court will
stay its hand
till the extrinsic fact is ascertained, and the condition thus
78
fulfilled.
According to this early interpretation, at the time of the FAA's
enactment, New York courts were required to issue stays pending
arbitration under section 5 of the New York Arbitration Act. Thus, since
the FAA was drafted with the New York arbitration statute as a model,
the FAA should also be read as requiring the issuance of a stay pending
arbitration and not a dismissal, even when all actions before the court are
arbitrable.
IV.

ISSUING A STAY PENDING ARBITRATION: THE SPLIT AMONGST
THE COURTS

A.

Circuits Requiring Stay Pending Arbitration

This Note takes the position that under the FAA, if a court decides
to compel arbitration the court must stay litigation instead of issuing a
dismissal, even when all issues are found to be arbitrable. This is the
proper procedure to take in accordance with the language of the FAA
and the policies in support of arbitration. Some circuit courts have
mistakenly permitted a dismissal when all issues are referable to
arbitration and when one of the parties motioned for a stay.79
However, even when all legal disputes are capable of being
resolved through arbitration, courts should nonetheless issue a stay.
There are considerable benefits associated with a stay that would not be
achieved if the presiding judge were to dismiss the pending lawsuit. For
example, issuing a stay would prevent the undue burden of
reestablishing subject matter jurisdiction at the stage of enforcement of

75. Id.at291.
76. See id.("Whether they have so contracted is a question which the court must still
determine for itself." (citing 1920 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 275, § 3)).
77. Id.
78. Id.at 291-92 (emphasis added).
79. See cases cited supra note 7 (citing cases in support of dismissal).
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an arbitral award.8 ° In addition, issuing a stay would allow for judicial
supervision during arbitration and would prevent the undue burden of an
appeal. 8 ' Courts prematurely dismiss litigation instead of issuing a stay
in order to clear their dockets; such courts do not act in the best interests
of the parties. Instead, issuing a stay would allow a court to successfully
protect the parties' contractual rights as well as their rights under the
FAA.
1. The Tenth Circuit
The leading case in the Tenth Circuit with respect to this issue is
Adair Bus Sales Inc. v. Blue Bird Corp.82 The case involved two parties
who had contracted for the license to sell Blue Bird school buses.83 The
parties signed a distribution contract which contained an arbitration
agreement.84 Soon after contracting, a dispute arose between the
parties.85 In an effort to avoid arbitration, plaintiff Adair Bus Sales Inc.,
brought suit against defendant, Blue Bird Corp., in the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico, alleging breach of
contract and requesting damages.86 Plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment that the arbitration clause did not apply to the parties'
dispute.87 In response, defendant moved for a stay pending arbitration.8 8
Plaintiff countered by seeking an injunction prohibiting defendant from
pursuing litigation. 89 At trial, the district court found that the dispute was
within the scope of the arbitration agreement and that all issues of the
case were arbitrable. 90 The district court9 dismissed the complaint and
ordered the case to proceed to arbitration. 1
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
vacated the district court's order of dismissal and remanded the case for
entry of stay pending arbitration in accordance with FAA section 3.92
The court reasoned that Congress intended to "promote appeals from
orders barring arbitration and limit appeals from orders directing
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See infra notes 209-16 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V.C.
25 F.3d 953 (10thCir. 1994).
See id.
at 954.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 954-55.
See id.
at 955-56.
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arbitration., 93 Since the issuance of a dismissal would result in an
appeal 94 and the issuance of a stay would not, 95 it is clear that Congress
intended for courts to issue stays because it would limit an appeal of an
order directing arbitration. 96 Accordingly, the court held that upon a
motion for stay pending arbitration, the proper course "would have been
for the district court to grant defendant's motion
to stay the action
97
pending arbitration," rather than dismiss the action.
2. The Third Circuit
In Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC0 8 plaintiff Bruno Lloyd, applied for
employment with one of the defendants in the case, Wyatt, V.I. Inc.
("Wyatt"). 99 Plaintiff signed a dispute resolution agreement as a
condition of having his application considered.' 00 After being denied
employment, plaintiff brought suit against Wyatt in the United States
District Court of the Virgin Islands, alleging several claims, including
discriminatory conduct in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.101 In response, Wyatt filed a motion to compel arbitration, and
to stay the proceedings pending arbitration. 102 Plaintiff opposed the
03
motion, arguing that the agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable.1
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted Wyatt's motion to
compel arbitration and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.'04
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district
court "erred in refusing to enter a stay order,"' 0 5 and was obligated "to

93. Id. at 955; see also Filanto, S.P.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 984 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir.
1993) (citing Pub. L. 100-702, tit. X § 1019(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4670-71 (1988), codified as 9 U.S.C.
§ 16) ("When Congress in 1988 added a new provision governing appeals of orders concerning
arbitration, it endeavored to promote appeals from orders barring arbitration and limit appeals from
orders directing arbitration.").
94. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86-87 (2000).
95. See id. at 87 n.2; Adair Bus Sales, Inc. v. Blue Bird Corp., 25 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir.
1994) (noting that "a stay pending arbitration entered pursuant to § 3 will virtually always be

characterized as an interlocutory, and not a final decision within § 16(a) (3). Because § 3
contemplates a suit brought on 'any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing,' the
likelihood of the presence of issues other than the dispute's arbitrability is inherent.").
96. See Adair, 25 F.3d at 955.
97. Id.
98. 369 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2004).
99. See id. at 266.
100.

Id.

101.

Id.at 266-67.

102. Id. at 267.

103. Id.
104. Id.

105. Id.at 271.
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grant the stay once it decided to order arbitration." ' 0 6 The court offered
several reasons for its holding which included, "taking the Congressional
text at face value."' 0 7 In addition, the court held that even in instances
where parties are ordered to arbitrate all claims, such parties are still
entitled to seek the court's assistance during the course of the
arbitration.108 Also, issuing a stay would allow the parties to proceed
immediately to arbitration without the delay of an appeal.10 9 Finally, the
court held that "a literal reading of section 3 of the FAA not only leads
to sensible results, it also is the only reading consistent with the statutory
scheme and the strong national policy favoring arbitration."' " 10
B.

CircuitsPermittingDismissals

Courts that have left the decision of whether to stay or dismiss to
the presiding judge offer several policy arguments in favor of such
interpretation. These courts argue that FAA section 3 was not intended
to limit dismissal of a case in the proper circumstances-for example,
when all claims raised in court are subject to arbitration."' Proponents
argue that any post-arbitration remedies sought by the parties will not
entail renewed consideration and adjudication of the controversy on the
merits. 1 2 Instead, any post-arbitration

remedies sought would be

circumscribed to judicial review of the arbitrator's award in the limited
manner prescribed by law. 1 3 As such, retaining jurisdiction and staying
the action would serve no purpose."'
In addition, such courts reason that the FAA does not "divest
district courts of their customary authority to provide appropriate relief
and to manage their dockets." ' 15 Moreover, these courts do not believe
that Congress intended to defer appellate review in all cases until
106. Id. at269.
107.

Id.

108. See id. at 270 ("[T]he District Court has a significant role to play under the FAA even in
those instances in which the District Court orders the arbitration of all claims. Even in those
instances, the parties are entitled to seek the Court's assistance during the course of the
arbitration."); see also infra Part V.B.
109. See Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 270.
110. Jdat271.
11. Green v.Ameritech Corp., 200 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2000); Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch.,
Inc., 133 F.3d 141 (1st
Cir. 1998); Adair Bus Sales, Inc. v.Blue Bird Corp., 25 F.3d 953 (10th Cir.
1994); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992).
112. Alford, 975 F.2d at 1164 (quoting Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Sea-Land of Puerto Rico, Inc.,
636 F. Supp. 750, 757 (D.P.R. 1986)).
113. Id.
114. Id.
NAT'L L. J., Aug. 16, 2004, at12, 12.
115. Mark 1.Levy, ArbitrationAppeals 11,
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completion of the contested arbitration.1 16 Proponents of dismissals
argue that requiring a stay would render part of FAA section 16 largely
ineffective because unlike a dismissal, an order to stay litigation is not a
final decision and not immediately appealable. 1 7 This, however, is a
misguided interpretation of FAA section 16 as it fails to take into
account the other instances where a court decision is considered final
and immediately appealable. One example of where a decision is
considered final and immediately appealable is when a court denies a
motion to compel arbitration. Thus, even by disallowing a dismissal
under FAA section 3, FAA section 16 is still effective.
1. The Ninth Circuit
Sparling v. Hoffman Construction Co. 118 is the controlling authority
in the Ninth Circuit with regard to the requirements of FAA section 3.119
In this case, plaintiffs Michael and Jean Sparling and Active Erectors &
Installers, Inc. ("Active"), filed suit against Hoffman Construction Co
("Hoffian") over a dispute that arose out of an agreement to construct a
high school. 120 The contract between Active and Hoffman contained an
arbitration clause. 121 In response to the lawsuit brought by plaintiffs,
Hoffman made a motion to stay the proceedings until the matter was
arbitrated. 122 The United States District Court in Washington dismissed
and Hoffman
Active's claims, because the contract between Active
123
required such claims to be submitted to arbitration.
On appeal, Active argued that dismissal was improper on several
grounds. 124 First, Active argued that dismissal was improper because
125
defendant only requested a stay pending arbitration, not a dismissal.
Active also argued that the district court lacked discretion to dismiss the
claims, because the provision for stay in FAA section 3 was defendant's
only remedy where there is an arbitration clause. 26 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected each of these arguments. First, the
court held that the fact that a dismissal was not requested does not make

116.

See id.

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Seeid.
864 F.2d 635 (9thCir. 1988).
Id.at 638.
Id.at 636.
Id. at 637.
Id. at 636.
Id.at 637.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 638.
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it improper. 127 With regard to Active's second argument, the court
agreed that FAA section 3 "gives a court authority, upon application by
one of the parties, to grant a stay pending arbitration .... ,,128 However,
FAA section 3 does not limit the court's authority to grant summary
29
judgment or dismissal when all claims are to be sent to arbitration.
2. The Fifth Circuit
In A/ford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 130 plaintiff Joan Chason
Alford sued her former employer, Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., and
former supervisor Don Harris, alleging discrimination in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.131 Defendants demanded that
plaintiff arbitrate her claims based on an arbitration clause in the broker
32
registration agreement plaintiff signed pursuant to her employment.
Defendants made a motion to dismiss the claim and to compel
arbitration. 133 The district court
dismissed plaintiffs claims with
134
arbitration.
ordered
and
prejudice
On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court's dismissal with
prejudice of her claim was "contrary to the precise terms" of FAA
section 3.135 Plaintiff claimed that it was mandatory to grant a stay "upon
a showing that the opposing party has commenced suit 'upon any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration."",13 6 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied these
arguments, and held that the weight of authority supports dismissal of a
case when all of the issues faced in the trial court must be submitted to
127. Id. at 637-38.
128. Id. at 638.
129. See id. (relying on Martin Marietta Aluminum, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 586 F.2d 143 (9th
Cir. 1978)). In Martin Marietta, the party seeking to invoke arbitration did not apply for a stay
under FAA section 3. Martin Marietta, 586 F.2d at 147. The court held that a request for a stay
pending arbitration is not mandatory. Id. Thus, since a stay must be at the request of one of the
parties, the court decided to instead grant a motion for summary judgment since the arbitration
provision was sufficiently broad enough to bar all of plaintiff's claims. Id. at 147-48. However, the
facts in Martin Marietta differ substantially in comparison with Sparling v. Hoffman Construction
Co. because the latter involved a defendant who did in fact motion for a stay under FAA section 3.
Thus, although summary judgment may have been appropriate in Martin Marietta, it was not
appropriate in Sparling because the defendant in Sparling moved for a stay pending arbitration.
130. 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992).
131. Id. at 1162.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1163. The defendant in Alford did not motion to stay the proceedings pending
arbitration. Thus, this case does not address the same factual question which is at issue in this Note.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1164.
136. Id. (citing Campeau Corp. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 723 F. Supp. 224, 227 (S.D.N.Y.

1989)).
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arbitration.' 37 The court reasoned that any post-arbitration remedies
sought by the parties in court would be limited. 138 In general, courts do
not give renewed consideration to the merits of a controversy after an
arbitral proceeding has taken place.' 39 The only future court action
brought by the parties that would require judicial intervention would be
to assess the legality of the arbitrator's award. 140 Relying on such
that retaining jurisdiction and staying the action
rationale, the court held 141
would serve no purpose.
3. The First Circuit
In Bercovitch v. Baldwin School Inc., a2 plaintiff Bercovitch,
brought a suit against defendant Baldwin School Inc., after being
indefinitely suspended by the school. 143 Defendant moved to dismiss the
case and compel arbitration, based on an arbitration agreement between
the parties found in the school's by-laws. 144 At trial, the district court
denied the motions and maintained jurisdiction over the case. 145 On
appeal, the First Circuit vacated the district court's decision. The court
court
dismissed the claim and referred the matter to arbitration. 46 The
147
arbitrable.
are
claims
all
when
proper
is
dismissal
a
that
reasoned
4. The Sixth Circuit
Green v. Ameritech Corp.,148 is the primary authority in the Sixth
Circuit with regard to this stay-dismissal dichotomy. 149 In this case,
defendants Ameritech Services Inc. and Ameritech Corp. (collectively
"Ameritech") faced state law claims of age and race discrimination and
retaliation brought by its former employee Daniel Green.15 0 Green

137. Id. at 1164.
138. Id. (quoting Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Sea-Land of Puerto Rico, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 750, 757
(D.P.R. 1986)).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141.

Id.

142. 133 F.3d 141 (lst Cir. 1998).
143. Id. at 143.
144. Id. at 143, 146. Here, however, the defendant did not motion for stay, thus this case does
not bear on the concerns at issue in this Note.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 156 (citing Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir.
1992)).
148. 200 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2000).
149. Id. at974.
150. Id. at967.
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brought a state court action which was removed to federal court.' 5 1 At
trial, the parties agreed to binding arbitration and the district court
dismissed the action with prejudice. 152 The arbitral proceedings resulted
in an award in favor of Ameritech. 153 Green then appealed the
arbitrator's decision under the same case number as its original federal
court action. 154 His second time before the court, Green argued that the
arbitrator breached the arbitration agreement by failing to explain his
decision with respect to each of the legal theories advanced by Green
during arbitration. 55 The United States District Court for the Eastern
had exceeded his powers and
District of Michigan held that the arbitrator
156
remanded the case to a new arbitrator.
On appeal, Ameritech argued that a stay rather than a dismissal
would be necessary, in order for Green to challenge the arbitrator's
award before the original federal court. 157 This was due to the fact that
the district court's dismissal of the first case left "no open proceeding
158
below" through which Green could challenge the arbitrator's ruling.
Thus, in order to have established subject matter jurisdiction, Green
should have instituted a new action under section 10 of the FAA. 5 9 The
court held that the district court's jurisdiction to review the employee's
challenge was not limited by section 10 or the parties' agreement.'60
5. The Fourth Circuit
61
Choice Hotels International,Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc.,'
involved a franchise agreement that allowed plaintiff BSR Tropicana
Resort to open a motel using defendant Choice Hotels International,
Inc.'s brand name.' 62 The franchise agreement between the parties
contained an arbitration provision which required "any controversy or
claim relating to [the] agreement" to be "sent to final and binding
arbitration."' 63 Plaintiff filed suit for failure to pay the affiliation fee and

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 972.
158.

Id.

159.

Id.at 972-73.

160.
161.

Id.at 974.
252 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2001).

162.

Id. at 709.

163.

Id.
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breach of their franchise agreement. 64 In response, defendant moved to
were to be sent to
dismiss the lawsuit, asserting that the claims 166
65 The district court denied the motion.
1
arbitration.
On interlocutory appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
vacated and remanded the case with instructions to stay the proceedings67
pending arbitration since there was at least one non-arbitrable claim.'
The court conceded that the FAA requires a district court, upon motion
by any party, to stay judicial proceedings involving issues covered by
written arbitration agreements.168 The court stated that defendant's
"motion to dismiss was not a proper § 3 motion because the sole remedy
available under § 3 is a stay. ' 16 9 However, "[n]otwithstanding the terms
of § 3 ... dismissal is a proper remedy when all of the issues presented
in a lawsuit are arbitrable.,' 70 The court furthered reasoned that a "hyper
technical reading" of defendant's pleadings would be inconsistent with
the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements," and that it
was clear during proceedings in the district court that defendant was
seeking to enforce the arbitration clause.171
V.

EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF WHY COURTS MUST STAY RATHER
THAN DISMISS UNDER FAA SECTION 3

There are several reasons why section 3 of the FAA should be
interpreted to require courts to issue a stay pending arbitration, if
requested by either party, instead of an order of dismissal even when all
issues before the court are arbitrable. First, according to the plain
language of the statute, the FAA affords courts no discretion in choosing
to dismiss the case instead of issuing a stay pending arbitration. Second,
the court plays a vital and important role throughout and at the close of
the arbitral proceedings. Issuing a stay pending arbitration will, in a
practical sense, encourage such a role. Third, undue burden will result
from an appeal of a dismissal. Finally, the overall legislative scheme
supports arbitration and arbitration will be further supported by the
issuance of a stay rather than a dismissal.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
(1983)).

Id.
Id.
ld.at 710.
Id. at 712.
Id.at 709.
Id.
Id.at 709-10.
Id. at 710 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'I Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
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Plain Language Interpretationof FAA Section 3

In general, "the starting point for interpreting a statute is the
language of the statute itself."'' 72 Courts should look beyond the plain
meaning of statutory language only when it produces a result
"demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the drafters,"' 173 or that is
"so bizarre that Congress could not have intended it.' 174 Here,
interpreting FAA section 3 as requiring a stay would produce a result
that would uphold the intention of the drafters, because it would keep
technicality, delay, and expense to a minimum.1 75 According to the
language of section 3:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon any issue referable to arbitrationunder an agreement in
writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending,
upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceedings
is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application
of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration
has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing
the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such
arbitration. 176
The use of the word "shall" in FAA section 3 affords courts no
discretion in deciding whether to grant a motion to stay pending
arbitration. 77 In Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC the court held, that the
"directive that the Court 'shall' enter a stay simply cannot be read to say
that the Court shall enter a stay in all cases except those in which all
claims are arbitrable and the Court finds dismissal to be the preferable
' 78 By contrast,
approach."'
"the statute clearly states, without exception,
that whenever suit is brought on an arbitrable claim, the Court 'shall'
upon application stay the litigation until arbitration has been
concluded."'' 79 Accordingly, the precise language of section 3 does not

172. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
173. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp. 511 U.S. 531, 563 (1994).
174. Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 (1991).
175. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220-21 (1985) (stating that the FAA's
ratification was motivated by a congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had
entered, and to encourage efficient and speedy dispute resolution).
176. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2005) (emphasis added).
177. See Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC, 369 F.3d 263,269 (3d Cir. 1994).
178.

Id.

179. Id.
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afford courts leeway to dismiss
a case where one of the parties applies
8
0
arbitration.'
pending
for a stay
Although the FAA contains no express provision' 8 1 for dismissing
litigation, rather than staying it, some courts have mistakenly done So182
Courts have held that a dismissal is appropriate, primarily in situations
where all claims can be submitted to arbitration,1 83 This however is not a
valid justification for denying a party's motion to stay. The language of
section 3, by its terms, takes into consideration the situation where all
claims presented before a court are being submitted to arbitration. The
drafters envisioned such a state of affairs, as evidenced by the phrase,
"[i]f any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon any issue referable to arbitration."'84 Thus, arguing that a
dismissal is permitted under FAA section 3 when all issues are arbitrable
completely misconstrues the language of the statute. The statute by its
terms takes into account situations where a case may entail both
arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims. Thus, according to the language of
FAA section 3, courts must determine whether an issue is arbitrable, and
even if such court finds all issues arbitrable, it must on application of
one of the parties issue a stay.1 85 Accordingly, the correct interpretation
of section 3 of the FAA is to require courts to issue a stay pending
arbitration upon application of one of the parties. The precise language
of the FAA fails to justify any other action by the court.
B. A Stay Supports the JudicialRole of Supervision andReview
In order for arbitration to function as an efficient and effective
process of private dispute resolution, litigation challenging the arbitral
process must be minimized. 186 There is an ever-present need to prevent
"judicialization" of the arbitral process,'8 7 which would involve courts
over-exerting their control. At the same time, some public supervision
and control is needed in order to protect broader social interests that may
be ignored or jeopardized by private arbitrators.18 8 This is why the FAA
180. See id; Adair Bus Sales v. Blue Bird Corp., 25 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 1994).
181. See generally Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2005).
182. See cases cited supra note 7.
183. See Green v. Ameritech Corp., 200 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2000); Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch.,
Inc., 133 F.3d 141 (lst Cir. 1998); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir.
1992); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988).
184. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2005).
185. Lloyd, 369 F.3d at 269; Adair, 25 F.3d at 955.
186.

ALAN SCoTr RAU ET AL., ARBITRATION 134 (2d ed. 2002).

187. See id.
188. See id.
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is structured to allow for judicial supervision and control over issues that
may arise at different stages of the arbitral process.189 Such supervision
can be exercised during the arbitration, or when an award made by
arbitrators comes before the court for review and enforcement. 190
Thus, in order to serve both the need for public supervision and the
need for speedy dispute resolution, courts must issue a stay of litigation
pending arbitration instead of dismissal. Otherwise, if a presiding judge
dismisses a case, the parties would be forced to file a new action
whenever they may require the court's assistance. Also, should the
arbitrators fail to resolve the entire controversy, a stay would spare the
parties the burden of a second litigation.
There is another policy reason for issuing a stay over a dismissal.
While it is possible that an arbitration may proceed without the aid of the
court, such scenario is beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note
addresses the situation where a lawsuit has commenced and the trial
court seeks to submit the matter to arbitration. This occurs when one
party seeks to avoid arbitration and the other party openly and willingly
wishes to arbitrate. A court must compel arbitration because there is a
party present who does not wish to willingly arbitrate. Thus, as a matter
of policy, it would seem to be in the best interest of the party seeking to
avoid arbitration to have the court retain its jurisdiction over the dispute
in such a situation. Issuance of a stay pending arbitration is the only
method to achieve this goal and thus should, as a matter of policy, be
granted upon the application of one of the parties.
1. Judicial Assistance During Arbitral Proceedings
The types of disputes settled by a court during arbitration include
the appointment of an arbitrator or filling of an arbitrator vacancy, 191
compelling the attendance of witnesses, or punishing a witness for
contempt.1 92 Other relief granted by courts in pending arbitration
189.
190.

Seeid
See id.

191. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1925) ("If in the agreement provision be made for a
method of naming or appointing an arbitrator ... such method shall be followed; but if no method
be provided therein ... then upon the application of either party to the controversy the court shall
designate and appoint an arbitrator ... .
192.

See id. § 7.

The arbitrators ... may summon in writing any person to attend before them or any of
them as a witness ....

Said summons shall ... be served in the same manner as

subpoenas to appear and testify before the court; if any person or persons so summoned
to testify shall refuse or neglect to obey said summons, upon petition the United States
district court for the district in which such arbitrators, or a majority of them, are sitting
may compel the attendance of such person or persons before said arbitrator or arbitrators,
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includes the issuance of interim remedies. 193 Interim relief ordered by
arbitrators can include preliminary injunctions, 94 temporary restraining
orders, orders of attachment, 195 liens, security bonds, 196 and other
mechanisms that serve to protect parties' property or interests until
disputes are finally adjudicated by the arbitrator. 197 Another role the
courts may play during arbitration is ordering consolidation of arbitral
proceedings, 98 or granting class arbitration classification. 99 In some
cases, preliminary injunctive relief is necessary to ensure that the
arbitration process remains a meaningful one for both parties. 20 0 Thus, a
stay is a more appropriate solution than a dismissal because a stay
preserves the court's authority to order such interim remedies without
unduly interfering in the arbitration of the underlying claims.2 '

or punish said person or persons for contempt in the same manner provided by law for
securing the attendance of witnesses of their punishment for neglect or refusal to attend
in the courts of the United States.
Id.
193. IAN R. MACNEIL ET. AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND
REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, § 24.1.2 (1999). The majority view is that

courts have the authority to award interim remedies in appropriate cases, however, there is a
minority of cases that have reached the opposite conclusion. See id. § 25.4.1.
194. Id. § 25.4.2.
195. Id. § 25.4.3.1; Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. China Ins. Co., 79 N.E. 425 (N.Y. 1948).
A plaintiff seeking an attachment must show, inter alia, that he has a cause of action. If
plaintiffs complaint and affidavits fail to establish a prima facie cause of action, or if
they clearly establish the plaintiff must ultimately be defeated, the defendant may vacate
the warrant of attachment .... Certainly, it cannot be said that a plaintiff fails to state a
prima facie cause of action merely because the contract upon which suit is brought
contains an agreement to arbitrate. Defendant's sole remedy is to apply for a stay of
plaintiffs action until the arbitration has been had.
Id. at 427.
196. MACNEILETAL.,supra note 193, § 25.4.3.2.
197. Id. § 25.4.1.
198. See DOMKE, supra note 23, § 32.2. ("Two or more separate arbitration proceedings may
be ordered to be consolidated by the courts when at least one party is common to the arbitrations to
be held and the issues are substantially the same, as long as no substantial right of a party is
prejudiced by the consolidation."); see also Hoover Group Inc. v. Probala & Assocs., 710 F. Supp.
677, 679 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (quoting DOMKE, supra note 23, § 32.2).
199. DOMKE, supra note 23, § 32.3 (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444
(2003)). "The Federal Arbitration Act does not foreclose class arbitration and the question of
whether class arbitration was permissible under an arbitration clause was a matter of contract
interpretation under state law." Id.
200. Tennessee Imports, Inc. v. Filippi, 745 F. Supp. 1314, 1325 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
201. See id
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2. Judicial Assistance After Arbitral Proceedings
An arbitral award is not self-enforcing and must be confirmed in a
court of law.2 °2 Upon completion of arbitration, a court either enforces a
judgment on an award or enforces an order vacating or modifying an
award.2 °3 If confirmed, the award is reduced to an enforceable
judgment. a° When an arbitration award has been rendered into a
judgment, it is enforceable in the courts in the same manner as any other
judgment. 20 5 In domestic United States cases, the FAA and companion
state arbitration statutes provide for judicial enforcement of arbitral
awards.20 6 In international cases, the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958
provides for 20 7uniform and efficient enforcement of awards
internationally.
Re-establishing subject matter jurisdiction is a procedural problem
that may arise at the time of enforcement or modification of an arbitral
award.20 8 Whether the problem arises is dependent on whether the trial
court previously issued a stay pending arbitration or a dismissal
following a determination that the issue was arbitrable. Issuing a
dismissal may have bearing on whether a court will respect the subject
matter jurisdiction of the claim after the dismissal.20 9
In order to challenge an arbitrator's decision under the FAA or to
enforce an award, the moving party must establish subject matter
202. DOMKE, supranote 23, § 44.2.
203. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2005). "If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the
court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration... then... any party to the
arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the
court must grant such an order." Id.
204. DOMKE,supranote 23, § 45.1.
205. ld. § 46.1.
206. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2005).
207. N.Y. Convention, U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
208. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. Valenzuela Bock, 696 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
Plaintiffs were unable to re-establish federal question jurisdiction after the court dismissed litigation
and ordered arbitration under FAA section 4. Id. at 958. The original suit was for securities
violations and clearly conferred federal question jurisdiction on the court. Id However, the court
held that it did not have jurisdiction to grant intermediary relief. According to the court "the fact
that the dispute was initially waged in federal court does not, without more, vest [the court] with
[federal subject matter] jurisdiction." Id. at 959. The court further discussed that if the previous
court had issued a stay, and retained jurisdiction then the present court "would have had ancillary
power also to consider an application to compel" under FAA section 4. Id. However, since the
action was dismissed and there was no federal action pending to which the arbitration could be
ancillary then federal jurisdiction did not exist. Id. For federal jurisdiction to exist it "must be
premised on this petition itself and not on a prior action no longer before the federal court." Id.
209.

MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 193, § 9.2.3.4.
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jurisdiction.21 ° With regard to domestic arbitration, the FAA itself does
not confer federal question jurisdiction.2 ' Under the FAA, federal
jurisdiction is available only if otherwise available through some
independent source such as diversity or federal question.2t 2 If, however,
there was a pending proceeding in the district court, then there would be
no need to re-establish subject matter jurisdiction.
The issuance of a stay under FAA section 3 allows parties to return
to the federal court in which the stayed litigation is pending.21 3 Upon
returning, the federal court will decide whether to confirm, vacate or
modify the arbitral award received by the parties.2 14 Issuing a stay will
prevent the need to re-establish subject matter jurisdiction when such
parties return to court after receiving an award.21 5
Granting a motion to dismiss will "create a new need for subject
matter jurisdiction if the parties seek to return to the court for any
purpose. 21 6 Thus, for efficiency reasons and to prevent subjecting
parties to such risk of re-establishing subject matter jurisdiction, courts
must grant motions to stay litigation pending arbitration when one of the
parties makes such an application.
C. Undue Burden Would Result Due to an Appeal Resultingfrom
Dismissal
A problem parties seeking to invoke arbitration presently face
occurs when a presiding judge in compelling arbitration dismisses the
claim.2 17 This action is problematic because the dismissal of an action
triggers appellate jurisdiction, "whereas staying the proceedings pending
arbitration would preclude an immediate appeal. 21 8 Congress, in an
210. See Green v. Ameritech Corp., 200 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2000).
211. MACNEIL ET AL., supranote 193, §§ 9.1, 9.2.2.
212. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32.
213. MACNEIL & SPEIDEL ET AL., supra note 195, at § 9.2.3 (By issuing a stay under FAA
section 3, "[a]fter an award, parties desiring to confirm, vacate, or modify the award, can return to
the federal court in which the stayed litigation is pending for determination of those issues.").
214. Id.

215. Id.
216. Id. § 9.2.3.4. However, "where in addition to dismissing the litigation the court orders

arbitration under FAA § 4, the existence of that order may continue the jurisdiction of the court
sufficiently so that no new showing of subject matter jurisdiction will be required if a party returns
for further judicial action in connection with the arbitration." Id.
217. See generally Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC, 369 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2003); Adair Bus Sales v.
Blue Bird Corp., 25 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 1994).
218. Pierre H. Bergeron, District Courts as Gatekeepers? A New Vision of Appellate
JurisdictionOver Orders Compelling Arbitration, 51 EMoRY L. J. 1365, 1378 (2002); Green Tree
Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86, 87 n.2 (2000).
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effort to "promote appeals from orders barring arbitration and limit
appeals from orders directing arbitration," amended the FAA.219 Section
16(b) of the FAA prohibits appeals from an interlocutory order staying
an action pending arbitration pursuant to FAA section 3.22° On the other
hand, appellate review of a court order is permitted if the order is
classified as a "final decision., 22 1 When a court dismisses all claims
before it, that decision is a "final decision" within the meaning of FAA
section 16(b), and therefore appealable.2 22
The United States Supreme Court, in Green Tree FinancialCorp.Alabama v. Randolph, held that a dismissal is a final judgment and
immediately appealable. 223 At the trial level, the district court granted a
motion compelling arbitration, denied a motion to stay, and dismissed
the claims with prejudice.22 4 On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether an order compelling arbitration
and dismissing a party's underlying claim was a "'final decision with
respect to an arbitration' within the meaning of [section 16(a)(3)
of the
225
FAA] and thus is immediately appealable pursuant to that Act.
The Court held that the term "final decision" found in FAA section
16 has a well developed and "longstanding interpretation., 226 It is a
decision that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more
for the court to do but execute the judgment. 2 27 Since the FAA "does

219. Adair, 25 F.3d 953 at 955 (citing Filanto, S.P.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 984 F.2d 58, 60
(2d Cir. 1993)).
220. 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1)(4) (2005). Section 16 of the FAA governs appellate review of
arbitration orders. Subsection (b) provides: "Except as otherwise provided in section 1292(b) of title
28, an appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory order... (1) granting a stay of any action
under section 3 of this title; (2) directing arbitration to proceed under section 4 of this title; (3)
compelling arbitration under section 206 of this title; or (4) refusing to enjoin an arbitration that is
subject to this title." Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2005) (emphasis added).
221. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(l)-(3). Subsection (a) of FAA section 16 lists which procedural orders
trigger appellate jurisdiction. It provides:
An appeal may be taken from... (1) an order ...(A) refusing a stay of any action under
section 3 of this title, (B) denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order
arbitration to proceed, (C) denying an application under section 206 of this title to
compel arbitration, (D) confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial award,
or (E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award; (2) an interlocutory order granting,
continuing, or modifying an injunction against an arbitration that is subject to this title;
or (3) afinal decision with respect to an arbitrationthat is subject to this title.
Id.(emphasis added).
222. See 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000).
223. Id.
224. See id.
at 83.
225. Id. at 82.
226. Id.at 79.
227. Id.
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not define a final decision or otherwise suggest that the ordinary
meaning of final decision should not apply, the court accords the term its
well-established meaning.' 228 Since a claim leaves nothing more for the
court to do but execute the ruling it is a "final decision with respect to an
arbitration. 229
Accordingly, courts must grant a motion to stay litigation pending
arbitration, upon application of one of the parties. This is because a
dismissal results in an immediate appeal, while a stay is considered an
interlocutory order and is not appealable. On one hand, an appeal from a
dismissal causes further delay and hinders the disputing parties' ability
to arbitrate.23 ° On the other hand, issuing a stay pending arbitration
protects the rights of a party entitled to arbitrate. Granting a motion to
stay litigation pending arbitration achieves two results.2 31 It relieves the
party entitled to arbitrate of the burden of continuing to litigate the issue
before the court,232 and it alleviates the burden of an appeal and allows
parties to continue directly to arbitration.23 3 In contrast, an appeal from a
dismissal would force upon the party willing to arbitrate the unnecessary
burdens of delays and the costs associated with an appeal. 34 Denying a
motion to stay and granting a motion to dismiss would thwart the overall
purpose of23the
FAA which is to encourage efficient and speedy dispute
5
resolution.

D. The Overall Legislative Scheme Supports the Issuance of a Stay
The primary objective behind the enactment of the FAA was to
"enforce agreements into which parties had entered. 2 36 Secondly, the
FAA was enacted to encourage efficient and speedy dispute resolution
which would not be subject to delay and obstruction of the courts. 7
Since its adoption, there has been a "liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements," as well as a strong presumption in support of
arbitration seen in the federal courts. 238 This strong pro-arbitration policy
has been evidenced in a number of ways.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 79-80.
Id. at 80.
See Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC, 369 F.3d 263, 270 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).

236. Id. at 220.
237.
238.

Id. at 221; Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,404 (1967).
Moses H. Cone Mem'I Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
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Examples of the pro-arbitration policy include the concept of
separating arbitration clauses from the remainder of the agreements
containing them in determining the validity of those clauses. 239 Another
example is the rule requiring arbitration to proceed before litigation2 is
40
complete in cases involving both arbitrable and non-arbitrable issues.
Further, there is the rule that any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration. 24' Finally, the
rule that a court's inquiry is limited to ascertaining the existence of an
agreement to arbitrate and the viability of the arbitration clause, is a sign
of the courts' overall support of arbitration.2 42
In addition, the prevailing "spirit" of the FAA extends far beyond
its specific provisions.243 Such overall legislative policy supports the
notion that the drafters intended for parties to immediately pursue
arbitration. If a dismissal is awarded it would deprive the party seeking
arbitration of the opportunity to immediately commence arbitration
proceedings without incurring delay and the costs associated with an
appeal. Furthermore, issuing a stay pending arbitration will expedite the
judicial process because a single judge can preside over an entire
dispute. This is far more efficient than constantly reassigning a case to a
new judge who will have to learn the facts of the case anew. 2 "
VI.

CONCLUSION

The practice of issuing a dismissal instead of a stay pending
arbitration under FAA section 3 is highly questionable. Not only does
the language of the statute fail to justify a dismissal, but a dismissal can
lead to unfortunate consequences. When a court grants a stay pending
arbitration it retains jurisdiction. This keeps the proceeding alive and
eases securing judicial assistance if any is needed in connection with the
arbitration. When a court decides to send a lawsuit to arbitration, the
presiding judge must issue a stay if requested by either side, instead of
an order of dismissal, even when all issues before the court are
arbitrable. The FAA should be read as requiring the issuance of a stay
pending arbitration as a matter of statutory construction, legislative

239. See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 409; MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 193, § 8.6.
240. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 470 U.S. at 218-19, 221; Moses H. Cone Memorial
Mem'1. Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24; see also MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 193, § 8.6.
241. See Moses H. Cone Mem 7. Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25.
242. PrimaPaint Corp., 388 U.S. at 404.
243.
244.

MACNEIL ETAL.,supra note 193, § 8.6.
See Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC, 369 F.3d 263,270 (3d Cir. 2004).
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history, and sound public policy. Any other requirement would impose
undue burdens on parties seeking to arbitrate.
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